Bridge Concepts
Bryan Norton, an environmental pragmatist, suggests that one of the major problems with our various scientific disciplines today is the towering occurring within these disciplines. Towering is, he says, most often associated with an "obsessive insistence on a sharp separation of science and values" along with a separation between the gathering of information from the policy processes (Norton 33) . Towering is both the reason why we rarely engage one another across disciplinary boundaries and why we often fail to really understand one another when we do. In line with Norton's point, Charlene Seigfried writes that disciplines are narrowly strategic, and "strategic thinking becomes dangerous to the extent that it is not guided by more encompassing purposes" (Seigfried 38) . Rabinow highlights this form of towering in The Accompaniment by reminding us that the audience for research papers is really only other researchers in one's own subspecialty; this is obviously the opposite of seeking a wider public audience (Rabinow, Accompaniment 185) . Anthropos Today underlines this claim by highlighting the fact that different "interpretative communities" rarely ever pay attention to one another. In the end, towering blocks discordant information from influencing one's beliefs and thus prevents true learning (Norton 34) . One solution here is the creation of what Norton calls bridge concepts. Bridge concepts have empirical, measurable descriptive content and connect us back to our social values. Obesity is a bridge concept usefully employed in relation to our health (Norton 39) . Bridge terms can, despite beliefs to the contrary, carry social value and be used with some amount of precision. Without bridge terms, we as a citizenry tend to be left with a lot of "precise information," but little idea about what to do with it. Norton's bridge concepts, then, look like they work to "make the relations between logos and ethos apparent" and a part of our "way of life." Norton then suggests experts need to "learn from the public discourse" and to guide their "research toward questions that really matter in policy choices" (34).
Thus we see that one of the most striking reasons why science fits so poorly into our lives is because of the frequent attempts to separate science and values. This is inherently problematic in pragmatism not least because our knowledge is intrinsically guided by our values; it is a mistake to separate the two. "Expectations, values, and beliefs," Seigfried reminds us, "are already part of any experimental situation" (152). In the end, "there is no wholly neutral or value-free inquiry" Environmental Justice 194) . The mistake is not that values are present, but that we fail to examine which values are present and to consider whether they are the right or the wrong ones. Even worse, we at times work to mask such ethical assumptions in our speaking and writing. If, on the other hand, we were attentive to such value judgments, we could acknowledge how they have influenced our conclusions. It may even be the case that we can avoid some values, but in order to do so we need to be critically aware of them. Kristin Shrader-Frachette, an environmental philosopher, distinguishes between bias values, contextual values, and constitutive values. While bias values (misinterpretations or omissions of data) can be avoided, contextual values are more difficult, and constitutive values are in fact impossible to avoid. This is because research is always restricted by some kind of incomplete information and scientists cannot evade value judgments when they move to use one methodological rule over another (Risk and Rationality 41). Even when deciding on what data to use and what to ignore, value is present. As Rabinow said, understanding is a conceptual, but also a political and ethical practice.
Restructuring Relationships, Restructuring Thought Frank Fischer echoes these concerns; values, he says, are far too often hidden within the research process itself (42). Like Rabinow here, Fischer diagnoses the problem within an increasingly technocratic-Rabinow uses the word "autocratic"-society; this is especially true for the "practitioners of the life sciences and their medical colleagues" (Rabinow, Anthropos 118). Fischer goes further by claiming experts are far too often in the employ of the elite and sometimes generate specific data upon request. "By virtue of the professional's middle-level position in the societal hierarchy-that is, between management and labor, government and citizen-he or she typically tends to adopt the system's own definitions of its problems" (Fischer 31) .
On top of this we also need to remember that, "without interpretation, the data carried by the increasing flows of information are as meaningless as they are overwhelming" (Fischer 13) . In contrast to the constant influx of information, we see fewer and fewer citizens directly involved in the complex social problems we face today. Fischer, like Shrader-Frachette, also maintains that expertise is not neutral. In fact, today it is often the case that experts do not actually have solutions to the wicked problems we face.
2 Instead, expert solutions too commonly turn out to cause greater problems. A solution lies in restructuring the relationship between citizen and expert. Fischer reasserts Norton's concern that "technical languages provide an intimidating barrier for lay citizens" (23). These insights confirm Michel Foucault's point that power is diversely decentralized. Power, a la Dewey, is built into our habits.
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Removing or restructuring various institutions is not enough to displace current structures; we need to address our own habits as well. Thus, a key way to really change things is not simply, as Rabinow says, by changing "society or culture or power," but by changing our thought (Accompaniment 66). This leads Fischer to the conclusion that we require localized resistance, local knowledges (27). He, in fact, argues experts need citizens far more than their "professional ideologies have acknowledged" (35).
Democratic Deliberation
In contrast to such a technocracy, "citizen participation, defined as deliberation on issues affecting one's own life, is the normative core of democracy" (Fischer 1). Opportunities for participation and deliberation are, in actuality, what is most pressing and missing in this country (Fischer 35) . To this end, perhaps democratic deliberation is a means by which we can meliorate current problems. In Marking Time Rabinow wrote: "[N]o contemporary moral debates of any import have been resolved through disputation and argumentation alone" (79). But he, at the same time, acknowledged this does not mean nothing significant is happening here. Such participation could, in fact, help citizens see (1) that scientists are really also lay people in relation to policy and social judgments, and (2) that more science and technology cannot always solve our problems given how often "scientific technologies are themselves a cause" of these problems (Fischer 53) . John Dewey, in The Public and Its Problems, also focused on how a public could cope with the wicked problems of a modern, technologically obsessed society, pointing out the dual growth of both the rights of our citizens and the large corporate machine with a focus on technical expertise. For Dewey, the solution is to work further on the methods of deliberation and the conditions by which we can make this more possible. The expert's role in such a society is in facilitating greater understanding of such a complex world for its citizens. Instead, experts have very much separated themselves. We need our social institutions to help "remove the barriers that hinder or impede the shift of information from institutions to individual citizens" (Fischer 11) . Anthropology, Rabinow complains, is not reaching wide audiences and-most often-neither is science or philosophy.
In Marking Time he asks us to consider how to create these audiences, "how to invent forms to 'influence, instruct or outrage them'" (Rabinow, Marking Time 37) . Perhaps, one way to reconnect citizens and scientists is through advocacy research where we explicitly connect research to our own interests and concerns in our various communities and to the debate about future policy changes (Fischer 38) . In the end, Fischer is arguing that "the standard practitioner-client model must give way to a more democratic relationship" (39-40). And Democratic Deliberation, if we can get citizens to the table, does seem to engage and empower them. The question I am currently most concerned with is Rabinow's own: how can-and how should-we engage our citizens in the most pressing problems of our time?
That is, how do we get others to recognize there is a need for inquiry here? Perhaps Jane Addams provides us with a way in; Addams says: "[T]he mass of men seldom move together without an emotional incentive" (Addams 119). Emotional incentive, combined with a dose of uncertainty about the best way forward, opens the space for "an ethics to become a practice of inquiry rather than a discourse of values and expertise" (Rabinow, Accompaniment 175). As Dewey says, the pre-determined state of mind is "the chief obstacle to the kind of thinking which is the indispensable prerequisite of steady, secure and intelligent social reforms" (MW 15:76) . Effectively engaging an individual that has already made a determination about the matter under examination requires us to bring to her awareness components of the situation she had yet to consider, thus causing the puzzlement noted above. Oversimplifying the reality of our very serious problems or finding ourselves ignorant of the concerns of others allows individuals to avoid such complex and puzzling problems. As Rabinow said, "[P]roblematizing previously taken-for-granted apparatuses makes it clear that other modes and forms are possible and at least potentially feasible. For them to be actualized, however, requires not only rethinking but equally a corrosion of the power relations embedded in the habitus of a generation" (Marking Time 53-54). Perhaps one way we can begin to corrode such power relations is by situating knowledge. Doing so, Iris Marion Young tells us, "can both pluralize and relativize hegemonic discourses, and offer otherwise unspoken knowledge to contribute to wise decisions" (Young 7).
In the end, regress-Dewey cautioned us-is just as much a possibility as progress. I hope only to have succeeded in suggesting possible moves forward, potential pathways, for our mutual consideration, both toward reconstructing and reconnecting the discordant divisions within the academy and broader society. notes 1. By "fitting," I mean in a way that impacts our understanding of the issue, that brings to light the scientific, political, and ethical issues surrounding the topic under examination.
